Not since the United States floated the dollar in
the 1970s and threw the Bretton Woods system on the scrap heap of
history has the management of exchange rates so captured the
attention of economists and national politicians as China's
undervalued yuan does now.
Then, as now, all manner of polemics and the
weight of established authority argued that governments should
manage currency-exchange rates, much like they attempt to fix
prices, for example sugar or petroleum, to supposedly serve the
greater good.
We hear about China's weak financial system,
the pent-up demand for dollars in China, and the need for
exchange-rate stability in developing countries. However, we should
always be wary when professors, who enjoy the absolute protection of
tenure and corporate leaders and bankers, whose investments benefit
from government meddling in markets, argue that prices should be
regulated in the public interest.
China's financial system would be no more
rickety or vulnerable if the exchange for the yuan were maintained
at a level more consistent with underlying supply and demand in
foreign-exchange markets.
As things stand, thanks to China's huge trade
surplus and inward foreign investment, the international demand for
yuan greatly exceeds the supply. To limit market appreciation to
less than 5 percent a year, Chinese monetary authorities print yuan
to purchase dollars and other hard currencies valued at about $300
billion, annually. Otherwise, the value of the yuan against the
dollar would rise at least 40 percent to about 4.5 from its current
rate of about 7.6 per dollar.
In turn, Chinese authorities purchase U.S.
Treasuries and other securities to earn interest on their hoard, and
sell yuan-denominated bonds domestically to soak up the excess
liquidity these yuan sales create and head off inflation. This
increases Chinese savings and transfers purchasing power to, and
lower savings in, the United States.
Through this process, Beijing encourages
overinvestment in manufacturing export industries and excessive
urban development, stokes a speculative bubble in China’s stock
market, and provokes inflation in global oil markets. (China
manufacturers use energy much less efficiently than do competitors
making similar products in the West.)
All this causes underinvestment in Chinese
domestic needs, such as decent sanitation and clean water in rural
areas, and exacerbates income inequality that undermines the social
stability the Communist Party so earnestly seeks to preserve.
These processes also exacerbate job losses in
manufacturing and widens economic inequality in the United States
and other industrialized countries, thereby undermining political
support for the World Trade Organization system of free trade that
has so benefited China’s economic progress.
One of the curious accomplishments of the Bush
Administration and other defenders of this alchemy has been to label
as "protectionists" U.S. critics that advocate a market-determined
yuan.
What a novel idea for a Republican
administration - campaigning for free currency markets is a
protectionist conspiracy!
Equally remarkable, these defenders of rigged
markets have enlisted the conservative press to ridicule anyone who
proposes meaningful U.S. responses to the harmful effects of Chinese
mercantilism on the U.S. economy.
Clearly, it would ease Sino-American relations
if China revalued the yuan to, say, 6 or 6.5 per dollar. But once
China revalued substantially, its policy of woefully slow yuan
appreciation would no longer be credible among investors. Pressure
to keep revaluing the yuan upward would be incessant.
Right now, thanks to the yuan peg and inward
investment, China must purchase dollars and other currencies at a
pace equal to 10 percent of its gross domestic product and about 25
percent of its exports. That requires Beijing to work quite hard to
find enough domestic investors to purchase yuan denominated bonds to
increase domestic savings by that amount and head off a bout of
liquidity-driven inflation. The policy would collapse if the
government could no longer sell ever-larger amounts of
yuan-denominated bonds to recapture all the yuan it prints to buy
dollars and other hard currencies.
A stated policy of revaluing the peg to a
level that does not require persistent one-sided intervention
through large purchases of dollars would be credible and welcomed.
Revaluing, for example by 10 percent, initially, and then permitting
the yuan to rise 2 percent against the dollar each month, until
one-sided intervention was no longer required, would satisfy
financial markets and permit the necessary adjustments within the
Chinese economy to unfold in an orderly fashion.
What investors need to know is what the policy
is and that Beijing is moving the exchange rate for the yuan, in a
timely fashion, to a value that is consistent with China’s growing
competitive strengths.
Remember, the exchange rate is nothing but a
price. Sooner or later, when a government fixes prices, someone gets
hurt. Often, many ordinary working people get hurt the most.
Peter Morici is a professor at the University
of Maryland School of Business and former Chief Economist at the
U.S. International Trade Commission.
Peter Morici
Professor
Robert H. Smith School of Business
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742-1815
703 549 4338
Cell 703 618 4338
pmorici@rhsmith.umd.edu
http://www.smith.umd.edu/lbpp/faculty/morici.html
http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/pmorici/cv_pmorici.htm